CONTRACTS-HOLDOVER

AGREEMENTS-EMPLOYER NOT ENTI-

TLED To ENFORCEMENT OF HOLDOVER AGREEMENT WHERE
HE DOES NOT HAVE A PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN THE INFORMATION USED BY His FORMER EMPLOYEE IN CONCEIVING THE

INVENTION-Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 110 NJ. 609, 542
A.2d 879 (1988).
It is a general principle of law that a contract in restraint of
trade or occupation is valid only if reasonable.' This principle
follows from the premise that an individual should not be restrained by contract from utilizing his skill, knowledge and experience to earn a living. 2 The courts have, therefore, required
special justification for an employment contract which imposes
restrictions on an employee following the termination of his
employment. 3
A holdover or trailer clause is a contractual provision which
requires an inventor to assign to his former employer any invention conceived by him during some specified period proceeding
the termination of his employment.4 Inherent in every holdover
clause are the conflicting interests of the employer and the employee.5 Employers have an interest in preventing the use and
disclosure of business information, 6 as well as in receiving a just
1 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 1636, at 88 (3d
ed. 1972). In determining the question of reasonableness, the court must consider:
"1. The question whether the promise is broader than is necessary for the protection of the covenantee in some legitimate interest; 2. The effect of the promise...
upon the covenantor, and 3. The effect of the promise.., upon the public." Id. at
92-93.
2 GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 773 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
3 6A A. CORBIN, CONrRAcTS, § 1394, at 100 (1962). Corbin explained that
there is no special justification where:
the harm caused by service to another consists merely in the fact that the
new employer becomes a more efficient competitor just as the first employer did through having a competent and efficient employee. A restraint on the employee is illegal when its purpose is the prevention of
competition, except when the methods of competition to be prevented
are methods commonly regarded as improper and unfair.
Id.
4 Doherty & Iandiorio, The Law of the Employed Inventor-Timefor a Change?, 57
MASS.

L.Q. 27, 36 (1972).

5 See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134,

137-38 (1965).
6 Id. at 138. The Winston court noted that "restrictions upon an employee's
disclosure of information which was developed as a result of the employer's initiative and investment, and which was entrusted to the employee in confidence, are
necessary to the maintenance of decent standards of morality in the business community." Id.
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return on their investment in training employees. 7 Conversely,
employees have an interest in using their personal skills and
knowledge in a manner which allows them to reap maximum
benefits.8 Thus, underlying the question of enforceability of
holdover clauses is the desire for individuality and independence,
coupled with the reality that we are in large part a society of employees. 9 Recently, in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta,'° the New
Jersey Supeme Court limited the enforcement of holdover
agreements to inventions in which the employee utilized his former employer's "proprietary" information obtained during his
employment. 1
In the latter part of 1974, Armand Ciavatta 12 was hired by

Ingersoll-Rand Research, Inc. 1 3 as a program manager. 14 As a

condition of his employment, Ciavatta signed an agreement
which contained a provision requiring him to assign to IngersollRand his rights to inventions conceived within one year after the
termination of his employment if such inventions were the "result of" and "attributable to" work performed while at the company. 15 As program manager, Ciavatta worked on numerous
7 See Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d
201, 203-04 (1946).
8 See GTI Corp., 309 F. Supp. at 773.
9 See O'Hern, A Nation of Employees or Every Man a King-Who is to Say? Some
Views on Private Employment Law, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 842 (1989).
10 110 N.J. 609, 542 A.2d 879 (1988).
11 See id. at 643, 542 A.2d at 896. Initially, the court espoused that it was recognizing as protectible some information which did not rise to the level of proprietary. Id. at 638, 542 A.2d at 894. At the conclusion of the decision, however, the
court stated that although such information may not be trade secrets or confidential, it may be proprietary, and therefore, protectible. See id. at 643, 542 A.2d at
896.
12 Armand Ciavatta had been a practicing engineer for approximately 35 years.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant Armand Ciavatta at 3, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
Ciavatta, 216 N.J. Super. 667, 524 A.2d 866 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 110 N.J. 609,
542 A.2d 879 (1988). Since 1950, Ciavatta was employed or self-employed in a
number of engineering positions "involving a variety of engineering principles."
Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 614, 542 A.2d at 881. In 1972, Ciavatta was employed by
the Miller Falls Division of Ingersoll-Rand as Director of Engineering and Quality
Control. Id. at 615, 542 A.2d at 881. Ingersoll-Rand terminated Ciavatta's employment in that division and Ciavatta subsequently joined Ingersoll-Rand Research,
Inc. Id., 542 A.2d at 882.
13 Ingersoll-Rand Research, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of the IngersollRand Company. Id. at 612, 542 A.2d at 880. Both entities were parties to the
action and are referred to collectively in this note as "Ingersoll-Rand." IngersollRand has more than thirty divisions "engaged in the research, development, manufacture, and sale of products for use in various heavy industries." Id.
14 Id. at 615, 542 A.2d at 882.
15 Id. The agreement provided in part:
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development projects, many of which involved underground
mining. 16 Ciavatta became particularly interested in the field of
underground mining, and by 1976, he had submitted to Ingersoll-Rand thirteen patent disclosures relating to mining technology.' 7 Five of these ideas "were for devices to support or
stabilize" the roofs of underground mines.' 8
In March 1978, Ciavatta was named manufacturing manager
of the Split Set Division of Ingersoll-Rand Equipment Corporation.' 9 Ciavatta's duties as manufacturing manager of the Split
Set Division included "supervising the manufacture, production,
quality control, and distribution" of Ingersoll-Rand's split-set
In consideration of One Dollar ($1.00) paid to me by IngersollRand Company (hereinafter called the "Company"), the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, and of my employment by the Company
during such time as may be mutually agreeable to the Company and
myself, I have agreed as follows:
1. To assign, and I hereby do assign, to the Company, its successors
and assigns, my entire right, title and interest in and to all inventions,
copyrights and/or designs I have made or may hereafter make, conceive, develop or perfect, either solely or jointly with others either,
(a) during the period of such employment, if such inventions,
copyrights and/or designs are related directly or indirectly, to the business of, or to the research or development work of the Company or its
affiliates, or
(b) with the use of the time, materials or facilities of the Company
or any of its affiliates, or
(c) within one year after termination of such employment if conceived as a result of any is attributable to work done during such employment and relates to a method, substance, machine, article or
manufacture or improvements therein within the scope of the business
of the Company or any of its affiliates.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 5. Paragraph (c) requires the assignment of
inventions conceived after the termination of employment. Such a provision is
commonly referred to as a trailer or holdover clause. Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at
625, 542 A.2d at 887.
16 Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 6. Although Ciavatta's employment
through March 1978 was in a research capacity, "he was not formally involved in or
assigned to research or development" of Ingersoll-Rand's split-set friction stabilizer. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 210 N.J. Super. 339, 343, 509 A.2d 821, 823
(Ch. Div. 1986), rev'd, 216 NJ. Super. 667, 524 A.2d 866 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd,
110 NJ. 609, 542 A.2d 879 (1988).
17 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 NJ. at 616, 542 A.2d at 882. The policy at the IngersollRand Research Center was to "encourage[] the staff to be creative [and] to discuss
ideas for projects or potential projects beyond those to which they had been assigned." Id.
18 Id. The trial court found that Ciavatta had no experience in the field of mining and roof supports prior to his employment with Ingersoll-Rand. See IngersollRand, 210 N.J. Super. at 353-54, 509 A.2d at 829.
19 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 616, 542 A.2d at 882.
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friction stabilizer. 20 The split-set friction stabilizer is a patented
2
device used to stabilize the roofs of metal/non-metal mines. '
The product has been extensively marketed by Ingersoll-Rand
through advertisements and technical publications detailing its
specifications and capabilities. 22 As a result of its efforts, Ingersoll-Rand has enjoyed great commercial success in the sale of its
split-set stabilizer.23 On June 22, 1979, Ciavatta's association
with Ingersoll-Rand's Split Set Division ended when the company discharged him.24
Approximately two months after his termination, Ciavatta
conceived an elliptical friction stabilizer for mine roofs. 5 In the
months that followed, Ciavatta reduced his invention to practice
and in March 1980, he filed a United States patent application.26
In March 1981, Ciavatta filed an improvement patent application.27 Thereafter, a United States patent was issued to Ciavatta
on each application.2 8 Ciavatta subsequently began marketing
his invention and the product has been well received in the mining industry.2 9
20 Id. at 613, 542 A.2d at 880-8 1. Ingersoll-Rand was assigned the patent for the
split-set stabilizer by its inventor and has spent in excess of $1.35 million for research and development of the device. Id., 542 A.2d at 881. The device is a metal
cylinder which is forcibly inserted into a smaller, pre-drilled hole, in the roof of the
mine thereby undergoing radical [sic] deformation and reacting "outwardly against
the surface defining the hole." Id.
21 Id. at 614, 542 A.2d at 881.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 616-17, 542 A.2d at 882. Ciavatta's employment in the Split Set Division did not include researching, designing, inventing or modifying friction stabilizers. Id. at 617, 542 A.2d at 882-83.
24 Ingersoll-Rand, 210 N.J. Super. at 344, 509 A.2d at 824. Ingersoll-Rand contended that Ciavatta's employment was terminated because of unsatisfactory performance and poor relations with other employees. See Brief for PlaintiffRespondent Ingersoll-Rand at 15, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 216 N.J. Super.
667, 524 A.2d 866 (App. Div. 1987) (A-03955-85T8), aff'd, 110 N.J. 609, 542 A.2d
879 (1988). The trial court found, however, that Ciavatta was fired because of a
conflict with his supervisor. Ingersoll-Rand, 210 N.J. Super. at 344, 509 A.2d at 824.
25 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 617-18, 542 A.2d at 883. Ciavatta conceived the
idea while he was transferring a light fixture in his home. See Brief for Appellant,
supra note 12, at 10. Although the device is similar to Ingersoll-Rand's split-set
stabilizer, it differs in two respects: the circumference is closed, not split, and the
tube is elliptical in shape. Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 618, 542 A.2d at 883.
26 Id.
27 See Ingersoll-Rand, 216 N.J. Super. at 670, 524 A.2d at 858.
28 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 618, 542 A.2d at 883. In February 1982, United
States Patent No. 4,316677 was awarded on the first application and in March 1982,
United States Patent No. 4,322183 was awarded on the second application. Id.
29 Ingersoll-Rand, 210 N.J. Super. at 344, 509 A.2d at 824. More specifically, the
trial court stated that "[tihe market place has begun to accept defendant's product
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In July 1982, Ingersoll-Rand requested by letter that
Ciavatta assign his patent to the company.3 0 Ciavatta, however,
denied any obligation to do so. 3 ' Consequently, on April 17,

1984, Ingersoll-Rand filed suit against Ciavatta, alleging that his
refusal to assign the patents was in violation of his employment
contract. 32 Ingersoll-Rand prayed for an assignment of
Ciavatta's invention and the related patents, as well as an accounting for damages. 3 Ciavatta denied that he had violated the
employment agreement and asserted several affirmative defenses
including laches, unenforceability of the agreement, estoppel,
and unclean hands.34
The New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, held
that although Ciavatta's invention was not based on any trade
secrets or confidential information pirated from Ingersoll-Rand,
the holdover clause was enforceable. 35 The appellate division reand his device appears to be a competitive threat to plaintiff's device. I find as a
fact that defendant's device sells at a lower price than plaintiff's device." Id.
30 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 619, 542 A.2d at 884.
31 Id.
32 Id. Additionally, the complaint alleged that Ciavatta had violated his employment contract by disclosing Ingersoll-Rand's confidential information. Brief for
Appellant, supra note 12, at 1. At trial, Ingersoll-Rand withdrew this claim. Id.
33 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 619, 542 A.2d at 884.
34 Id. at 619-20, 542 A.2d at 884. Ciavatta later added a counterclaim to his
answer, alleging libel and unfair competition. Id. at 620, 542 A.2d at 884. The
counterclaim and Ingersoll-Rand's request for an accounting were severed for separate trial. Id.
35 Ingersoll-Rand, 210 N.J. Super. at 353-55, 509 A.2d at 829-31. In reaching its
decision, the trial court addressed Ciavatta's argument that the test formulated to
determine the enforceability of noncompetition agreements should apply to holdover agreements. See id. at 347-53, 509 A.2d at 825-29. Cases that have addressed
the enforceability of noncompetition clauses in employment contracts have limited
enforcement of those contracts to situations where the employer's trade secrets,
confidential information or customer relations are in interest. See infra notes 90116 and accompanying text. The trial court believed that a covenant not to compete directly restrained the signatory's employment opportunities and the use of
his skills and experience. Ingersoll-Rand, 210 N.J. Super. at 351, 509 A.2d at 828.
This direct effect, the court reasoned, warrants the limitation imposed by the
courts. Id. The court asserted that holdover agreements may only potentially restrict an employee in his search for employment. Id. In the court's opinion, such
an "indirect deterrent to alternative employment" did not warrant limiting an employer's protectible interests to trade secrets and confidential information. Id. at
352, 509 A.2d at 828. Rather, the court stated that it would enforce the holdover
agreement "if it is fair, reasonable and justifiable in light of the facts and circumstances of [the] case." Id. at 353, 509 A.2d at 829. In concluding that the holdover
clause was enforceable, the trial court considered the following findings of fact:
(a) The invention is related to and a direct result of defendant's employment with the plaintiff ....
(b) [Ciavatta's] knowledge of the underground mining industry in gen-
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versed, ruling that the test established in the line of cases deciding the enforceability of noncompetition agreements was
applicable to the question of enforceability of the holdover provi37
sion.36 The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification
and affirmed, holding that the holdover agreement was unreasonable, and therefore, unenforceable as it related to Ciavatta's
invention of the elliptical friction stabilizer.38
Under the 1952 Patent Act, a person is not entitled to a patent if he did not invent the subject matter of the underlying invention." Similarly, unless an inventor has contracted away his
rights in his invention, the invention is generally regarded as beeral and the use of friction stabilizers to support mine roofs was based
entirely on his employment experience with [Ingersoll-Rand]....
(c) Ciavatta's employment with [Ingersoll-Rand] from 1974 exposed
him to the creative processes within [Ingersoll-Rand's] organization relevant to the invention....
(d) Ciavatta utilized Ingersoll-Rand's information, experience, expertise and ideas and the creative interaction gleaned from his employment
[in devising his invention]....
(e) Existence of the holdover clause and its enforcement would not
constitute a significant deterrent to a change of employment by Ciavatta.
His work experience as an engineer was varied....
(f) Enforcement would not violate any legitimate expectations of
defendant....
(g) There is no evidence that defendant pirated trade secrets or confidential information....
(h) There is no evidence that plaintiff's friction stabilizer involved
trade secrets.
Id. at 353-55, 509 A.2d at 829-30.
36 See Ingersoll-Rand, 216 N.J. Super. at 672, 524 A.2d at 869-70. Initially, the
appellate court accepted the trial court's factual findings that the invention did not
involve trade secrets or confidential information. Id. at 671, 524 A.2d at 868. However, applying the test formulated in the cases involving noncompetition agreements, the appellate court concluded that Ingersoll-Rand did not have a legitimate
protectible interest in the information utilized by Ciavatta in conceiving his invention. See id. at 675-77, 524 A.2d at 871. Moreover, enforcement of the holdover
clause would work an undue hardship on Ciavatta, as it would "impose upon [him]
a prohibition, effective for one year over an unlimited geographical area, from
working on mine supports." Id. at 676-77, 524 A.2d at 871. Accordingly, the court
concluded that the holdover agreement, as it applied to Ciavatta, was not enforceable. Id. at 678, 524 A.2d at 872.
37 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 108 N.J. 192, 528 A.2d 18 (1987).
38 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 643, 542 A.2d at 896. Although the supreme court
affirmed the appellate court's decision to apply the test established in the noncompetition cases, the court expanded the boundaries of an employer's protectible interests. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
39 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1988). If the inventor is unable or unwilling to execute an
application, it may be filed by a person who has a proprietary interest in the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 118 (1988).
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ing the inventor's exclusive property.4 ° The rights of the employee-inventor, however, are limited by certain common law
doctrines, as well as any contractual arrangement that may exist
between the employee and his employer.4
In InternationalPulverizing Corp. v. Kidwell,4 2 the court applied
the common law doctrine that an employee who is employed to
invent is obligated to assign to his employer the invention and
resulting patents.4 3 The defendant, Nicholas K. Stephanoff, was
a mechanical engineer employed by the plaintiff, International
Pulverizing Corp., to study and experiment with a new type of
pulverizing mill for which the plaintiff owned a patent. 44 The
plaintiff's objective was to improve the commercial efficiency of
the new mill. 45 Stephanoff ended his employment with the plain-

tiff, and thereafter, filed a patent application for an improved pulverizing mill. 46 The plaintiff argued, and the trial court agreed,

that the defendant had conceived of his improvement during the
period of his employment with the plaintiff.47 The court found
that the plaintiff had employed Stephanoff, at least impliedly, to
invent and improve the pulverizing mill and that the parties understood that any invention resulting from Stephanoff's endeavors would belong to the plaintiff.48 Thus, the court ordered

Stephanoff to assign
all of his interest in the improved mill patent
49
to the plaintiff.

Even where an employee is not hired to invent, an employer
40 See New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F.2d 277, 279 (2d Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 591 (1934); International Pulverizing Corp. v. Kidwell, 7 N.J.
Super. 345, 348, 71 A.2d 151, 152 (Ch. Div. 1950).
41 See Comment, Employer's and Employee's Rights in PatentsArising From the Employment, 11 VILL. L. REV. 823, 826-29 (1966).
42 7 N.J. Super. 345, 71 A.2d 151 (Ch. Div. 1950).
43 Id. at 347, 71 A.2d at 151-52.
44 Id. at 349, 71 A.2d at 153.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 351, 353, 71 A.2d at 154-55. Defendant was subsequently granted a
patent. Id. at 353, 71 A.2d at 155.
47 Id. at 354, 358, 71 A.2d at 155-56, 158.
48 Id. at 358, 71 A.2d at 158.
49 Id. at 359, 71 A.2d at 158. The court expressed the applicable rule of law:
Where a person expressly or impliedly contracts to devote his mental
faculties and exercise his inventive ability for the benefit of his employer, the inventions conceived by him in the course of his employment
and as a consequence of its pursuit belong in equity to the employer.
Id. at 347, 71 A.2d at 151-52 (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289
U.S. 178 (1933); Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924); Solomons v.
United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890); Marcalus Mfg. Co. v. Sullivan, 142 N.J. Eq. 434,
60 A.2d 330 (Ch. 1948); Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 N.J. Eq. 293, 78 A. 698
(Ch. 1910); Connelly Mfg. Co. v. Wattles, 49 N.J. Eq. 92, 23 A. 123 (Ch. 1891)).
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may obtain an interest in the employee's invention if the employee utilized the employer's resources in the discovery. 50 This
"shop-right rule" was first applied by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Kinkade v. New York Shipbuilding Corp.5 The plaintiff in
Kinkade was employed by the defendant to install sleeping bunks
on military ships.52 On his own time, the plaintiff conceived of a
device which simplified the installation of the bunks. 53 On company time and with company materials, the plaintiff manufactured a sample of his device.5 Thereafter, the company utilized
the plaintiff's design and in so doing, substantially reduced its
labor costs. 55 Receiving no additional compensation, the plaintiff

sought damages from his employer for the use of his device.56
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, entered judgment
on ajury verdict for five thousand dollars.5 7 The Supreme Court
of New Jersey certified the case on its own motion and reversed. 58 In arriving at its conclusion, the court first noted the
mere fact that an inventor is employed at the time of conception
of an invention does not give any interest in the invention to the
employer.5 9 The court held, however, that New York Shipbuilding Corporation had an irrevocable but non-exclusive right to
use the plaintiff's invention although it was conceived by the
plaintiff on his own time. 6° The court reasoned that since the
plaintiff used the defendant's "time, facilities, and materials to
attain a concrete result, the latter [was] in equity entitled to use
that which embodies his own property and to duplicate it as often
as he may find occasion. '"61
50 Comment, supra note 41, at 828. This common law interest is not an assignment of the employee's rights. Rather, it is a non-exclusive license to use an employee's invention. Id. See also United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.
178, 188 (1933); Kinkade v. New York Shipbuilding Corp., 21 N.J. 362, 369-71, 122
A.2d 360, 363-65 (1856); 9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS,
§ 1016, at 110 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1984).
51 21 N.J. 362, 122 A.2d 360 (1956).
52 Id. at 365, 122 A.2d at 361. The defendant, New York Shipbuilding Corp.,
had contracted with the government to convert three passenger liners into military
vessels. Id. The installation of the sleeping bunks was part of the conversion. Id.
53 Id. at 365-66, 122 A.2d at 362.
54 Id. at 367, 122 A.2d at 362.
55 See id. at 366, 122 A.2d at 362.
56 Id. at 368, 122 A.2d at 363.
57 Id. at 364, 122 A.2d at 361.
58 Id.
59 See id. at 369, 122 A.2d at 363-64.
60 Id. at 371-72, 122 A.2d at 365.
61 Id. at 371, 122 A.2d at 364 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser
Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933)).
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The common law doctrines applied in Kidwell and Kinkade establish an employer's rights in an employee's invention, irrespective of an employment contract. 62 Most modern technical
companies, however, do not rely on these common law doctrines
to establish their rights.6" Instead, they require their starting employees to sign assignment agreements in an attempt to fix their
rights in their employees' inventions.' The NewJersey Supreme
Court addressed the validity of such an agreement in Misani v.
Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp.65 In Misani, the defendant, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. employed plaintiff as an organic chemist to conduct research.66 As a condition of her employment, plaintiff
executed an agreement which required her to assign to Ortho
"all of her rights in inventions, improvements and ideas which
she might make or conceive during her employment." 67 Sometime after the termination of her employment, plaintiff brought
an action against Ortho for damages that allegedly were caused
by Ortho's failure to designate plaintiff as an "inventor" in a patent application.68 The trial court ruled that Ortho owned any inventions made by plaintiff during the course of her employment
by virtue of the assignment agreement. 6 9 The appellate court upheld the validity of the assignment agreement 70 and the New
Jersey Supreme7 Court affirmed that portion of the appellate
court's holding.

1

62 For a further discussion of the common law doctrines see Note, Patent Ownership: An Employer's Rights to His Employee's Invention, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863
(1983).
63 Id. at 875.
64 Note, Reform for Rights of Employed Inventors, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 608 (1984).
Pursuant to such agreements, an employer may obtain patent rights in or ownership of inventions conceived by the employee. Id.
65 44 N.J. 552, 210 A.2d 609 (1965), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 203 (1965).
66 Id. at 554, 210 A.2d at 610.
67 Id.

68 Misani v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 83 N.J. Super. 1, 8, 198 A.2d 791, 794
(App. Div. 1964), rev'd, 44 N.J. 552, 210 A.2d 609, appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 203
(1965).
69 Id. at 12, 198 A.2d at 796.
70 Id., 198 A.2d at 796-97. The appellate court further stated that:
Ortho owed her no duty to patent, or refrain from patenting, these inventions or any aspect of them, or, if it did apply for patents, to do so
properly or adequately, or to repair any deficiency in the patent issued,
by amendment or otherwise.
Id. at 14, 198 A.2d at 797.
71 Misani, 44 N.J. at 554, 210 A.2d at 610 (citing Patent & Licensing Corp. v.
Olsen, 188 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1951); Paley v. Du Pont Rayon Co., 71 F.2d 856,
858 (7th Cir. 1934); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353, 355 (9th
Cir. 1927); Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952);
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Prior to Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, no New Jersey court
had addressed the validity and enforceability of employment
agreements which purport to bind an inventor to assign an invention conceived by him after the termination of his employment.7 2
New Jersey courts did, however, previously address the validity of
post-employment restrictions arising from noncompetition
clauses in employment contracts. 73 The Court of Errors and Appeals considered the enforceability of such
an agreement in Ir74
vington Varnish Insulator Co. v. Van Norde.
In Irvington, the defendant, Van Norde, entered into an employment agreement with plaintiff, Irvington, which required him
to "refrain from engaging in, being employed by, or otherwise
connected with.., any competing business enterprise located in
the United States" for a period of two years following the termination of his employment.7 5 Subsequently, Van Norde terminated his employment with plaintiff and accepted a position with
a competitor. 6 Irvington sought to enforce the covenant not to
compete against its former employee, alleging that he had gained
confidential information as to plaintiff's machinery, equipment,
methods and processes.7 7 The trial court found that Irvington
had failed to establish that Van Norde had acquired any confidential information from Irvington and accordingly dismissed its
complaint. 8
The Court of Errors and Appeals reversed, holding that it
§ 397 comment a (1958)). But see Note, supra
note 64, at 608 (asserting that the Misani court's enforcement of such a broad
agreement "will discourage inventive employees from pursuing private investigations outside the scope of their work assignments").
72 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 627, 542 A.2d at 888.
73 See, e.g., Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 NJ. 408, 390 A.2d 1161 (1978); Whitmyer
Bros. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 274 A.2d 577 (1971); Solari Indus. v. Malady, 55 N.J.
571, 264 A.2d 53 (1970); A.T. Hudson & Co. v. Donovan, 216 N.J. Super. 426, 524
A.2d 412 (App. Div. 1987); Raven v. A. Klein & Co., 195 N.J. Super. 209, 478 A.2d
1208 (App. Div. 1984); Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super.
434, 444 A.2d 75 (Ch. Div. 1982); Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 336 A.2d
498 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975).
The supreme court in Ingersoll-Rand relied heavily on its prior determinations regarding the enforceability of covenants not to compete in employment contacts.
See Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 627-30, 542 A.2d at 888-89. The development of
those cases is therefore discussed here.
74 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (E. & A. 1946).
75 Id. at 101, 46 A.2d at 202. The purported consideration for this promise was
the employee's continued employment. Id.
76 Id. at 102, 46 A.2d at 202.
77 Id. at 101, 46 A.2d at 202.
78 Id. at 102-03, 46 A.2d at 202-03.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
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was not necessary that Irvington's methods or processes be "secret in the sense that they [were] known only to the employer and
those [employees in whom he confided]." ' 7 9 The majority noted

that during the course of employment, an employee acquires skill
and knowledge in his employer's business at the expense of the
employer.8 0 The majority reasoned that a noncompetition agreement was a reasonable method of preventing the employee or a
competitor from taking "unfair advantage" of the employer by
using knowledge and skill acquired during the employment.8 '
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Bodine asserted that such
restrictions have only been enforced to the extent necessary to
protect the employer's property rights.8 2 Further, the justice
posited that the effect of the majority's decision was to "deprive[]
the employee of the right to use his skill in the only industry he
has knowledge of."8 "
In 1949, the validity of a noncompetition agreement was
considered by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 4 In A. Hollander
& Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp. ,85 the plaintiff, sought to
enforce the terms of a noncompetition agreement and obtain
damages resulting from the defendant's use of its secret
processes.8 6 Initially, the supreme court noted that noncompetition agreements are enforceable if the "prohibition is reasonably
necessary for the protection of the business of the employer, is
not unreasonably restrictive in point of time or territory upon the
rights of the employee, and is not prejudicial to the public interests. ' 87 In holding that the plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief and an accounting for damages, the supreme court asserted
that the existence of a protectible "secret" is not determinative of
the employer's right to protection.88 In reaching its decision,
79 Id. at 105, 46 A.2d at 204.
80 See id. at 104, 46 A.2d at 203-04.
81 Id., 46 A.2d at 203.
82 Id. at 106, 46 A.2d at 204 (Bodine, J., dissenting) (citing Sternberg v. O'Brien,
48 N.J. Eq. 370, 22 A. 348 (Ch. 1891)).
83 Id.
84 A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 66 A.2d
319 (1949).
85 2 N.J. 235, 66 A.2d 319 (1949).
86 Id. at 239, 66 A.2d at 320.
87 Id. at 248, 66 A.2d at 325 (citing Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van
Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (N.J. 1946); Silbros, Inc. v. Solomon, 139 N.J.
Eq. 528, 52 A.2d 534 (Ch. 1947)).
88 Id. More specifically, the court stated that:
[tihe validity of the covenant is not predicated on methods or processes
secret in fact and revealed to the employee in confidence but rests on
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however, the court relied exclusively on facts which established
that the defendant had pirated certain of Hollander's business
secrets.89
The present test to determine the enforceability of noncompetitive agreements was first set forth in Solari Indus. v. Malady.90
In Solari, after the termination of his employment, Malady obtained a franchise from an Italian company for the distribution of
a product which competed with the products distributed by Malady's former employer, Solari. 9 1 Solari sued Malady seeking an
interlocutory injunction against Malady's distribution activities
for a breach of a noncompetition agreement.9 2 Solari asserted
that Malady posed a substantial risk to its customer relations.9
The chancery court found that the covenant not to compete to
violate New Jersey's public policy because it did not contain any
express geographical limitations. 9 '

The New Jersey Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and
held that regardless of whether a noncompetition provision is divisible by its terms, it is subject to total or partial enforcement
"to the extent reasonable under the circumstances. '9 5 In remanding the case to the chancery court for further factual findings, the supreme court stated that employers are entitled "to
the protection afforded an employer against disclosure of business and
industrial methods and processes used, records compiled and customer
contacts made in the employment.
Id.
89 See id. at 249, 66 A.2d at 325-26. See Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle, 58 NJ. 25, 31,
274 A.2d 577, 581 (1971) (finding that the facts relied on in Hollander bring it fairly
in line with the subsequent decision of Solari Indus. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 264
A.2d 53 (1970)).
90 55 NJ. 571, 264 A.2d 53 (1970).
91 Id. at 574, 264 A.2d at 54-55.
92 Id., 264 A.2d at 55. The noncompetition agreement in Malady's employment
contract provided as follows:
Malady agrees that on the termination of his employment, for any reason whatsoever, he will not for one year thereafter engage, either directly or indirectly, without the prior consent in writing of the Board of
Directors of Solari Industries, in promoting or selling equipment, products, appliances or systems similar to or competitive with any of those
represented by Solari Industries or Solari America nor will he within
said year divert or attempt to divert from Solari Industries or Solari
America or any business represented by it any business whatsoever, particularly by influencing or attempting to influence any of the customers
with whom he may have had dealings in connection with the promotion
of equipment, products, appliances or systems hereunder.
Id. at 573, 264 A.2d at 54.
93 See id. at 586, 264 A.2d at 61.
94 Id. at 575, 264 A.2d at 55.
95 Id. at 585, 264 A.2d at 61.
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that limited measure of relief within the terms of the noncompetitive agreement which is reasonably necessary to protect their legitimate interests, will cause no undue hardship on the [former
employee], and will not impair the public interest." 96 The
supreme court concluded that if the findings on remand established that Solari's customer relations were indeed at risk, the
injunction should restrain Malady only from dealing with Solari's
actual or prospective customers.97
Approximately one year later, in Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle,98 the
New Jersey Supreme Court defined the "legitimate interests"
protectible under the first prong of the reasonableness test announced in Solari.99 In Whitmyer, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction enjoining its former employees 00° from operating
a competing business.' 01 One of the defendants, Doyle, had
been employed as general manager of the plaintiff's northern division and had also served as an officer and director of the company.' °2 After Doyle left the plaintiff's employ and began
operating a competing business, the plaintiff instituted suit, seeking enforcement of a noncompetition clause in Doyle's employ3
0

ment contract.1

The trial court entered an order restraining the defendants,
10 4
pending a final hearing, from competing with the plaintiff.
The trial judge ordered the injunction based on the existence of
the restrictive covenant, without regard to the plaintiff's "legitimate interests," the "hardship" imposed on the defendants or
the injury "to the public."' 1 5 The appellate court granted a stay
Id.
Id. at 586, 264 A.2d at 61.
58 NJ. 25, 274 A.2d 577 (1971).
99 Solari Indus., 55 N.J. at 585, 264 A.2d at 61.
100 Although plaintiff's complaint named Doyle, Smith, Wetterau and Statewide
Hi-Way Safety, Inc. as defendants, the action centered around a noncompetition
agreement between the plaintiff and Doyle. See Whitmyer, 58 N.J. at 28, 274 A.2d at
578.
101 Id. The plaintiff was in the business of erecting guard rails and fences. Id. at
27, 274 A.2d at 578. The plaintiff's customers were primarily governmental entities and most of the work was retained by way of public bidding. Id. at 38, 274 A.2d
at 583.
102 Id. at 27-28, 274 A.2d at 578.
103 Id. Plaintiff sought to enjoin Doyle from being connected "in any manner
with the ownership, management, operation or control of any business" in competition with Whitmyer. Id. at 28, 274 A.2d at 578. The proscription was for five
years and was restricted geographically to all "state[s] east of the Mississippi [and]
in any other state in which Whitmyer had operated within three years." Id.
104 Id. at 30, 274 A.2d at 579.
105 See id., 274 A.2d at 579-80.
96
97
98
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of the injunction pending determination of the application for
10 6
leave to appeal, but leave was denied and the stay was vacated.
Finding that the plaintiff did not sufficiently establish "legitimate
interests" warranting a preliminary 0 injunction,
the supreme
7
court reversed the trial court's order.1
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Jacobs began by stating that an employee's covenant not to compete is enforceable if
it " 'simply protects the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious
to the public.' "108 The court then delimited the legitimate protectible interests of any employer. 10 9 Initially, the Whitmyer court
noted that the stifling of competition is not a legitimate interest
worthy of judicial protection."10 Rather, the court stated that an
employer's protectible interests are limited to trade secrets, confidential information and customer relationships."' The court
stated that the general knowledge and information of an industry
are neither trade secrets nor confidential information and an employer may not enjoin a former employee from using such knowledge and information.' 12 In so ruling, the Whitmyer court
expressly adopted Justice Bodine's dissenting opinion in Irvington.'I" The supreme court found that the plaintiff had failed to
establish that Doyle was utilizing trade secrets or confidential information." 4 The court further declared that the record did not
106 Id. at 31, 274 A.2d at 580.
107

See id. at 37-38, 274 A.2d at 583-84.

108 Id. at 32-33, 274 A.2d at 581 (quoting Solari Indus. v. Malady, 55 NJ. 571,

576, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (1970)).
109 See id. at 33-38, 274 A.2d at 581-84.
11o Id. at 33, 274 A.2d at 581.
''M See id. at 33-38, 274 A.2d at 581-84. Even in the absence of a restrictive covenant, an employer may enjoin his former employees form using or disclosing trade
secrets learned in confidence during employment. See Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout,
16 NJ. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954).
112 Whitmyer, 58 N.J. at 33-34, 274 A.2d at 581. Thus, upon the termination of his
employment, an employee may use the general skills and knowledge acquired during his employment. Boost Co. v. Faunce, 17 NJ. Super. 458, 464, 86 A.2d 283,
286 (App. Div. 1952). See also Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Koch Indus., 497 F.
Supp. 462, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[A] former employee cannot be restrained from
using his faculties, skills or experience learned, acquired or developed during his
former employment."); Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. O'Donnell, 627 S.W.2d
239, 243 (Texas Ct. App. 1982) ("[A] former employee may use in later employment or venture the general skills, knowledge and experience which he has acquired ... even if the former employment has acted to increase his skills and if such
training is complex and extensive.").
113Whitmyer, 58 NJ. at 34-35, 274 A.2d at 582 (citing Irvington Varnish and Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 NJ. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (E. & A. 1946)).
1i4 Id. at 37, 274 A.2d at 583. Although plaintiff had asserted that defendants
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support a finding that Doyle posed a risk of harm to the plaintiff's customer relationships." 5 Accordingly, the supreme court
reversed the trial court's order granting plaintiff a preliminary
injunction.,16
Subsequent to the decision in Whitmyer, New Jersey courts
have adjudicated the enforceability of noncompetition covenants
in numerous cases.'17 Ingersoll-Rand v. Gavatta, however, was the
first New Jersey case involving the question of enforceability of a
holdover clause."' In Ingersoll-Rand," 9 the New Jersey Supreme
were using bidding procedures which were either trade secrets or confidential information, the court believed that a preliminary injunction was inappropriate because defendants rebutted these allegations in a comprehensive denial. Id.
115 Id. at 38, 274 A.2d at 583-84. This was so because most of the work involved
public bidding and jobs would be awarded on the basis of price and not personal
considerations. Id. at 38, 274 A.2d at 583.
116 Id., 274 A.2d at 584.
117 See, e.g., Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408, 390 A.2d 1161 (1978); A.T. Hudson
& Co. v. Donovan, 216 N.J. Super. 426, 524 A.2d 412 (App. Div. 1987); Raven v. A.
Klein & Co., 195 N.J. Super. 209, 478 A.2d 1208 (App. Div. 1984); Mailman, Ross,
Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 444 A.2d 75 (Ch. Div. 1982);
Dwyer v.Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 336 A.2d 498 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 137 N.J. Super.
135, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975).
118 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 627, 542 A.2d at 888. This issue has been considered, however, by several federal courts. See, e.g., Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. United States,
432 F.2d 447 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Armorlite Lens Co. v. Campbell, 340 F. Supp. 273
(S.D. Cal. 1972); GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp 762 (S.D. Ohio 1969); Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
In determining the enforceability of a five year holdover agreement, the
Calhoon court considered the following three principles of law:
(1) Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is no greater than
necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate interest?
(2) Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not unduly harsh
and oppressive on the employee?
(3) Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not injurious to the
public?
Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. at 773 (citing Briggs v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d
757 (1942)). The Calhoon court concluded that the holdover agreement unreasonably restricted the defendant from utilizing "his general skill and knowledge in subsequent employment and is void against public policy." Id.
In Armorlite Lens Co., the court held that to require an assignment of an invention conceived after the termination of employment where the invention was not
based upon the employer's trade secrets or confidential information would amount
to an unreasonable restraint of trade. Armorlite Lens Co., 340 F. Supp. at 275. The
court stated that an agreement which required such an assignment was, therefore,
void and unenforceable. ld.
Other cases have not taken such a restrictive view of holdover provisions. In
Universal Winding Co., the district court applied the test established by the Rhode
Island courts in deciding the reasonableness of covenants not to compete. Universal
Winding Co., 108 F. Supp. at 333. Under the test, explained the court, a covenant is
void and unenforceable if it " 'extends beyond any apparently necessary protection
which the [employer] might reasonably require, and thus, without benefiting him, it
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Court decided that both types of post-employment restrictions
implicated similar interests and are to be decided by the same
standard. 120 In so doing, the court ruled that the holdover agreeCiavatta and Ingersoll-Rand was not
ment between
121
enforceable.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for a unanimous court, began her
analysis by discussing the common law position regarding the
rights of an employee and the employer concerning the employee's invention. 22 The justice restated the long recognized
principle that the common law protects and enforces an inventor's rights to his or her invention. 23 However, certain exclusive
and non-exclusive rights to an employee's invention may inhere
in the employer as a result of the inventor's employment status. 1 2 4 The court explained that rather than relying on ambiguous common law doctrines to define their rights to an employee's
oppresses the [employee], and deprives people in other places of the chance which
might be offered them' to avail themselves of his services." Id. at 332-33 (quoting
Herreshoffv. Boutineau, 17 R.I. 3, 7-8, 19 A. 712, 713 (1890)). In holding that the
one-year holdover agreement was valid and enforceable, the court found that the
provision did not unreasonably restrict the employee:
Under my interpretation, the field of design from which the employee
was excluded was a field (a) in which he had had no experience prior to
this employment and (b) which was but an insignificant fraction of the
entire field of machine design.
Id. at 333. The district court did, however, emphasize the fact that the employee
was exposed to the employer's current information and designs which were still in
an embryonic state. Id. Thus, the district court reasoned that the employer had a
protectible interest. Id.
The court in Dorr-Oliver, Inc., refused to enforce a one-year holdover agreement to an invention for a cargo trailer where the employee had not worked on
cargo trailers during the prior employment. Dorr-Oliver, 432 F.2d at 452. The
court espoused that to be enforceable, a holdover clause "must be limited to reasonable times and to subject matter which an employee worked on or had knowledge of during his employment." Id. at 452. Holdover agreements, declared the
court, provide a legitimate means to prevent "an employee from appropriating to
his own use or to the use of a subsequent employer inventions relating to and stemming from work done for a previous employer." Id.
"19 110 N.J. 609, 542 A.2d 879 (1988).
120 See id. at 634, 542 A.2d at 892.
121 Id. at 640, 542 A.2d at 895.
122 See id. at 622-23, 542 A.2d at 885-86.
123 Id. at 622, 542 A.2d at 885 (citing Blum v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
183 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1950); New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F.2d 277, 279
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 591 (1934); International Pulverizing Corp. v.
Kidwell, 7 N.J. Super. 345, 348, 71 A.2d 151, 152 (Ch. Div. 1950); 53 AM. JUR. 2D
Master and Servant § 111 (1970); 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 73 (1948); 2 L. ALTMAN, CALLMAN'S UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14.27 (4th
ed. 1982)).
124 See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
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invention, most employers allocate invention rights through employment agreements.' 25 These employment agreements, observed the supreme court, whereby an employee agrees to assign
to his or her "employer inventions designed or conceived during
the period of employment," are enforceable as long as they are not
unreasonable. 126
The supreme court noted that the contract provision at issue
in Ingersoll-Randwas for the assignment of an invention conceived
after the termination of Ciavatta's employment. 27 In examining
the public policy issues implicated by the enforceability of such a
provision, the court posited that there is concern that the lack of
sufficient motivation for an employee-inventor is resulting in
fewer United States patents issued to United States citizens and
1 29
companies.128 The court declared that the decisions of Boost,

holding that an inventor may use the general skills and knowl30
edge learned through his or her employment, and Whitmyer,
holding that an employer could not prevent a former employee
from competing with him, both served to encourage an inventor's creativity.' 3 ' On the other hand, the court observed that an
employer has a legitimate interest in protecting its "trade secrets,
confidential information and customer relations." 132 Justice Garibaldi noted that in recognition of these competing interests,
agreements which they have
courts have enforced holdover
33
found to be reasonable.1

Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 623, 542 A.2d at 886 (citing Jamesbury Corp. v.
Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205, 214 (1st Cir. 1971); Note, Reform for Rights of
Employed Inventors, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 608 (1984); Gullette, State Legislation Governing Ownership Rights in Inventions Under Employee Invention Agreements, 62 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 732, 738 (1980)).
126 Id. (emphasis added). Specifically, the court stated that "[c]ourts, however,
will not enforce invention assignment contracts that unreasonably obligate an employee in each and every instance to transfer the ownership of the employee's invention to the employer." Id. at 624, 542 A.2d at 886 (citing Comment, Employer's
and Employee's Rights in Patents Arising from the Employment, 11 VILL. L. REV. 823
(1966)).
127 Id. at 625, 542 A.2d at 887.
128 Id. at 625-26, 542 A.2d at 887. The effect, it is feared, is that the United
States will no longer lead the world in technology. Id. at 625, 542 A.2d at 887.
129 See supra note 112.
130 58 N.J. 25, 274 A.2d 577 (1971). For a discussion of the Whitmyer decision,
see supra text accompanying notes 98-116.
131 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 626, 542 A.2d at 887.
132 Id. (citing Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle,-58 N.J. 25, 32-33, 274 A.2d 577, 581
(1971); Solari Indus. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 576, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (1970)).
133 Id. The court stated that generally a clause is found to be unreasonable if it:
"(1) extends beyond any apparent protection that the employer reasonably requires; (2) prevents the inventor from seeking other employment; or (3) adversely
125
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The justice acknowledged that the issue of enforceability of a
holdover agreement was one of first impression for a New Jersey
court. 134 In adjudicating the case, however, the court considered

the concerns inherent in the enforceability of a holdover agreement to be analogous to those addressed in cases determining
the enforceability of noncompetition agreements. 135 The court
reasoned that the standard of enforceability of employee noncompetition contracts was applicable to the determination of the
enforceability of holdover agreements. 13 6 Recognizing that a
noncompetition agreement is given effect if it is reasonable
under the circumstances, 13 7 the court recounted the reasonableness test articulated in Solari 138 and Whitmyer i3 9 as whether the
covenant " 'simply protects the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee and is not
injurious to the public.' "140

In the court's opinion, the appropriateness of applying the
Solari/Whitmyer reasonableness test to the "question of the enforceability of holdover agreements" is supported by decisions of
courts in other jurisdictions.' 4 ' To corroborate that position,
Justice Garibaldi referred to numerous federal court decisions
which specifically addressed 'the question. 4 2 According to the
justice, all of the cases recognized that "the question of the enforceability of holdover covenants clearly presents the interest of
the employee in enjoying the benefits of his or her own creation,
on the one hand, and the interest of the employer in protecting
impacts on the public." Id. at 627, 542 A.2d at 887 (citing Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v.
United States, 432 F.2d 447, 193 Ct. Cl. 187 (1970); GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F.
Supp. 762 (S.D. Ohio 1969); Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D.
Conn. 1952); Note, Patent Ownership:An Employer's Rights to His Employee's Invention,
58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863, 879 (1983)).
'S4 Id.
135 See id. at 627-30, 542 A.2d at 888-89.
136 Id. at 634, 542 A.2d at 892.
137 See id. at 628, 542 A.2d at 888 (citing Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 3233, 274 A.2d 577, 581 (1971)).
138 55 N.J. 571, 264 A.2d 53 (1970). For a discussion of the Solari decision, see
supra text accompanying notes 90-97.
139 58 N.J. 25, 274 A.2d 577 (1971). For a discussion of the Whitmyer decision,
see supra text accompanying notes 98-116.
140 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 628, 542 A.2d at 888 (quoting Whitmyer Bros. v.
Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 32-33, 274 A.2d 577, 581 (1971)).
141 See id. at 630, 542 A.2d at 889.
142 See id. at 630-34, 542 A.2d at 890-92. Particularly, the court referred to: DorrOliver, Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 447 (Ct. Cl. 1970); New Britain Machine Co.
v. Yeo, 358 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1966); Armorlite Lens Co. v. Campbell, 340 F. Supp.
273 (S.D. Cal. 1972); GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Ohio 1969);
Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
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confidential information, trade secrets, and, more generally, its
time and expenditures in training and imparting skills and knowledge to its paid work force, on the other."' 4 3 Accordingly, the
court concluded that it would enforce holdover agreements to
the extent that they give employers " 'that limited measure of relief within the terms of the [holdover] agreement which would be
reasonably necessary to protect his legitimate interests, would
cause no undue hardship on the employee, and would not impair
the public interest.' "144
Justice Garibaldi explained that in applying this three-pronged "reasonableness" test, the reviewing court must balance
the employer's need for protection of his "legitimate interests"
and "the hardship on the employee."' 145 The justice noted, however, that the degree of the employer's interest may alone be146determinative of the enforceability of a restrictive agreement.
The court then proceeded to delimit the legitimate interests
of employers. 47 Initially, the court reiterated the established
principle that an employee may utilize the knowledge and skill
48
acquired during his or her employment without restriction.
Moreover, an employee may use such skills to compete with a
former employer. 149 Thus, the court concluded that an employer
has no legitimate interest in preventing competition with its for50
mer employee. 1

The supreme court noted that an employer's legitimate protectible interests have generally been limited to trade secrets,
confidential information and customer relations.' Justice Gari143 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 633-34, 542 A.2d at 892.
144 Id. at 634, 542 A.2d at 892 (quoting Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 35,

274 A.2d 577, 583 (1971); Solari Indus. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 585, 264 A.2d 53,
61 (1970)).
145 Id. at 634-35, 542 A.2d at 892.
146 See id. at 635, 542 A.2d at 892. Specifically, Justice Garibaldi reasoned that:
[i]n cases where the employer's interests are strong, such as cases involving trade secrets or confidential information, a court will enforce a
restrictive agreement. Conversely, in cases where the employer's interests do not rise to the level of a proprietary interest deserving ofjudicial
protection, a court will conclude that a restrictive agreement merely
stifles competition and therefore is unenforceable.
Id. at 635, 542 A.2d at 892 (citations omitted).
147 See id. at 635-39, 542 A.2d at 892-94.
148 Id. at 635, 542 A.2d at 892 (citing von Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade
Secrets, 47 VA. L. REV. 583, 586 (1961)).
149 Id.

150 See id.

151 Id. at 636, 542 A.2d at 893 (citing Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 274
A.2d 577 (1971); Solari Indus. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 264 A.2d 53 (1970)).
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baldi explained that the courts have imposed this limitation on
employers' legitimate interests because of "the broad definition
of trade secret and other confidential information."' 52 In addressing the argument advanced by Ingersoll-Rand against imposing such a limitation, the supreme court acknowledged that
"[t]oday, large corporations maintain at great expense modern
research and development programs."' 153 Additionally, the court
pointed out that members of such research programs are encouraged to openly discuss with each other their new ideas in a
unified creative effort. 1 "
The court accepted Ingersoll-Rand's contention that an employer may have a legitimate protectible interest in the information generated from this creative exchange, although it does not
rise to the level of "a trade secret or proprietary information. '
Although stating that this interest should be construed narrowly,
the court declined to delineate any specific guidelines to determine the existence of such an interest. 156 The supreme court
conceded that its recognition of this information as a protectible
interest would further confuse the distinction between an employer's legitimate interests and an employee's general skills and
knowledge acquired during employment. 157 The court, however,
reaffirmed its belief that today's employers have an interest in
protecting against the use or disclosure by a former employee of
information learned through a confidential position.1 58
Next, the supreme court discussed the second prong of the
Solari/Whitmyer test, restating that the evaluation of the reasonableness of a holdover agreement requires the court to "balance
the employer's need for protection and the [resulting] hardship
152

Id.

153 Id. at 637, 542 A.2d at 893.

154 Id., 542 A.2d at 894. The supreme court referred to these programs as "think
tanks." Id. In its petition for certification, Ingersoll-Rand contended that it maintained such a creative environment and that Ciavatta's invention was attributable to
his exposure to the program. See Petition for Certification of Plaintiff-Petitioner
Ingersoll-Rand at 8-11, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 110 N.J. 609, 542 A.2d 879
(1988) (A-3955-85T8).
155 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 638, 542 A.2d at 894. In so doing, the supreme
court expanded the definition of "legitimate interest." The court characterized this
nonproprietary information as "highly specialized, current information not generally known in the industry, created and stimulated by the research environment
furnished by the employer, to which the employee has been 'exposed' and 'enriched' solely due to his employment." Id.
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 Id. at 638-39, 542 A.2d at 894 (citing Stedman, Rights and Responsibilities of the
Employed Inventor, 45 IND. L.J. 254, 259 (1970)).
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on the employee."' 59 Holdover agreements, noted the court, restrict an employee's employment opportunities and impede one's
opportunity to obtain subsequent work."6 The court postulated
that in some cases, the inclusion of a restrictive agreement in an
employment contract may be part of the bargained-for-exchange,
while in others, it may be the consequence of unequal bargaining
power. 16' Accordingly, the court concluded that the reasonableness of holdover agreements must be determined on the particu162
lar facts of each case.

Justice Garibaldi next addressed the public interests implicated by the third part of the Solari/Whitmyer test. 6 The justice
restated that the public has an interest in "safeguarding fair commercial practices and in protecting employers from theft or
piracy" of proprietary information. 164 This interest must be considered in conjunction with the public interest in encouraging an
inventor's
creativity
and in promoting
technological
65
advancement. 1

In applying the Solari/Whitmyer test to the holdover clause in
question, the court unanimously held that the agreement was unreasonable and therefore not enforceable. 166 In so holding, the
court found that Ingersoll-Rand did not possess a legitimate protectible interest in the information which Ciavatta used in conceiving and developing his invention. 167 The court noted that
Ciavatta was hired neither to invent nor conduct research with
regard to Ingersoll-Rand's split-set friction stabilizer. 168 Moreover, the court emphasized that the technology underlying the
159 Id. at 639, 542 A.2d at 894.
160

Id.

161 Id.
162 Id.

See id. at 639-40, 542 A.2d at 894-95.
Id. at 639, 542 A.2d at 894.
See id. at 638-39, 542 A.2d at 894-95. The court noted that there is currently a
debate in the scientific community regarding the effect of secrecy on long term
technological progress. Id. at 639-40, 542 A.2d at 895 (citing Broad, As Science
Moves Into Commerce, Openness Is Lost, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1988, at Cl, col.5).
166 See id. at 640-43, 542 A.2d at 895-96. Initially, the supreme court stated that
the holdover agreement did not apply to Ciavatta's invention. Id. at 640, 542 A.2d
at 895. The court found that "Ingersoll-Rand ha[d] not established that Ciavatta
'conceived' of his invention as a result of his employment at Ingersoll-Rand." Id.
However, the court did not set forth its reasoning for this particular finding.
Rather, the supreme court proceeded to explain that even if the agreement did
apply to Ciavatta's invention, the agreement was unenforceable. See id. at 640-43,
542 A.2d at 895-96.
167 See id. at 641-42, 542 A.2d at 895-96.
168 Id. at 641, 542 A.2d at 895.
163
164
165
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split-set was more than fifty years old and that its specifications
and capabilities were widely known throughout the industry.16 9
The court found that Ciavatta's invention was the product of his
own general skills and knowledge and not the result of any current research program in which Ciavatta participated. 7 0 Thus,
the court reasoned that although Ciavatta had "employed certain
skills and knowledge he undoubtedly gained during his employment," the information was not proprietary and consequently,
not protectible.' 7' The court posited that requiring Ciavatta to
assign his invention to Ingersoll-Rand "would work an undue
hardship" on the former employee, and therefore, concluded
172
that the holdover agreement was not enforceable.
The restrictive effect of holdover agreements supports the
Ingersoll-Rand court's decision to apply the Solari/Whitmyer test
when determining the enforceability of such agreements. As the
supreme court correctly recognized, holdover agreements clearly
circumscribe an employee's ability to obtain employment during
their operative period. 73 That is, a prospective employer is not
likely to hire one whom he knows is obligated to assign to his or
her former employer any invention that the employee conceives
which is "attributable to work done during former employment."' 74 Although a holdover agreement "indirectly" restrains
an employee from obtaining alternative employment, as opposed
to the "direct" restraint imposed by a noncompetition
covenant,
75
it does not warrant different treatment. 1
169 Id. at 641-42, 542 A.2d at 895-96. The court emphasized the fact that the
friction stabilizer manufactured by Ingersoll Rand's leading competitor was identical in design to Ingersoll-Rand's split-set. Id. at 641, 542 A.2d at 895.
170 Id. at 642, 542 A.2d at 896.
171 See id.
172 Id. at 643, 542 A.2d at 896.
173 Id. at 639, 542 A.2d at 894. See also Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1965) (holdover clauses "limit the
employee's employment opportunities" and "interfere with the employee's movement to the job in'which he may most effectively use his skills."); Universal Winding
Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329, 332 (D. Conn. 1952) ("[N]o competitor of the
plaintiff in the field of winding machines would want to employ a designer who for
the first year was under obligation to disclose the fruit of his labor to the plaintiff
and in effect give the plaintiff a first option on any patentable rights.").
174 Ingersoll-Rand Co., 216 N.J. Super. at 672, 524 A.2d at 869. The appellate
court postulated that the effect of the holdover agreement in this case was to prevent Ciavatta from being employed to work in mine supports for one year. Id. at
676-77, 524 A.2d at 871.
175 In ruling that the Solari/Whitmyer test was inapplicable to holdover agreements, the trial court relied on the direct/indirect distinction. See Ingersoll-Rand,
210 N.J. Super. at 351-52, 509 A.2d at 825. The court found that under certain
circumstances, a holdover clause "may exert a substantial indirect restraint against
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Similar to a noncompetition agreement, a holdover agreement deprives the individual of the right to use the general skills
and knowledge acquired during employment. 176 The employee's
right to capitalize on such skills and knowledge, however, has
long been recognized by our courts. 17 7 By impeding that right, a
holdover agreement inhibits an individual from maximizing the
benefit of his or her personal skills. 178 The net result is to discourage an inventor's creativity and to dampen potential competition.' 79 Thus, holdover agreements implicate the same policy
concerns as noncompetition agreements and their enforceability
should be limited to inventions derived from8 0information in
which the employer has a "legitimate" interest.
Despite the supreme court's holding that the Solari/Whitmyer
reasonableness test will be used to assess the enforceability of
holdover agreements, the opinion creates several questions
which remain unresolved. Unlike the court's past decisions, the
Ingersoll-Rand opinion did not limit the employer's protectible interests to trade secrets and confidential information.''
Although the supreme court stated that this newly recognized interest should be narrowly construed, it is not clear to what extent
this interest will warrant judicial protection. However, that court
will probably require the employer to show that the employee
utilized current information created by its research environment,
and not merely that the
employee was assigned or exposed to
82
such an environment.1
employment by others ...e.g., where an employee was involved in research and
product development with an extensive employment history in a particular limited
field." Id. This distinction, however, is inapposite. The impact of either type of
agreement will of course be less on the employee who has a diversified employment
history. Nevertheless, both post-employment restrictions effectively preclude an
employee from working in the field in which he was last employed.
176 See Ingersoll-Rand, 216 N.J. Super. at 676-77, 524 A.2d at 871. See also IngersollRand, 210 N.J. Super. at 355, 509 A.2d at 830 (A holdover agreement imposes a
"one-year hiatus before the employee may utilize the expertise gleaned from his
prior employment.").
177 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
178 GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 773 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
179 Ingersoll-Rand, 216 NJ. Super. at 672, 524 A.2d at 869.
180 The trial court's decision to enforce the holdover clause was based in large
part upon the fact that Ciavatta's ability to invent the elliptical friction stabilizer
resulted solely from his experience with Ingersoll-Rand. See supra note 35 (factors
(a)-(d)). Enforcing a holdover agreement on this basis alone clearly contravenes
the principle that an employee may use the general knowledge and experience acquired during his employment.
181 See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
182 This is evidenced by the supreme court's decision in light of the trial judge's
finding that Ciavatta was involved in a research capacity from October 1974 to
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Most confusing about the court's extension of protectible information to include "highly specialized, current information...
created and stimulated by the research environment" 1 8 3

is

whether the court believed such information to be "proprietary."
The court initially announced that an employer has an interest in
the "current information" generated in its think tank environment, although it "is not a trade secret or proprietary."1 84 At the
conclusion of the opinion, however, the unanimous court espoused that this information was in fact "proprietary."'1 85 The
latter characterization is more congruous with the idea that an
employee may use the knowledge acquired during employment
except when that knowledge is of information in which his or her
employer has an ownership interest. 86
Whether the information is termed "proprietary," the creation of a new category of interest will only further blur the already fuzzy line between "general" and "protectible"
information. Moreover, the extension was unnecessary. If such
"specialized, current information not generally known in the industry" is generated in the employer's research environment, it
seems clear that it could be properly termed "confidential."
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the decision is where
the court finds that the holdover provision in Ciavatta's employment contract inapplicable to his invention.1 7 This definitive
March 1978, and "although he was not formally involved in or assigned to research
or development relevant to the friction stabilizer," Ciavatta was exposed "to creative processes within [Ingersoll-Rand's] organization relevant to the invention."
Ingersoll-Rand, 210 N.J. Super. at 343, 354, 509 A.2d at 823.
As the appellate court aptly stated:
We recognize that there is a legitimate interest of the employer to foster
the free exchange of ideas by its employees .... But the employer must
show that the information absorbed by the former employee was, in fact,
proprietary, and, therefore, subject to the broad protection afforded
trade secrets and other confidential information. Beyond this trade secret, confidential communication, and Patent Act protection, however,
the employer's interests must give way to an employee's right to leave
his job and use elsewhere those skills and that knowledge of the trade or
industry he has acquired during his employment.
Ingersoll-Rand, 216 N.J. Super. 667, 677-78, 524 A.2d at 872 (citations omitted).
183 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 638, 542 A.2d at 894.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 643, 542 A.2d at 896.
186 In general, the term proprietary means "[b]elonging to ownership; . ..relating to a certain owner or proprietor." Black's Law Dictionary 1097 (5th ed. 1979).
187 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 640, 542 A.2d at 895. The supreme court did not
explain the rationale behind this finding. Rather, the court merely asserted that
Ingersoll-Rand failed to establish "that Ciavatta had 'conceived' of his invention as
a result of his employment at Ingersoll-Rand." Id.
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statement is interesting considering the trial court's specific determination that the holdover provision contained in Ciavatta's
employment agreement was applicable to Ciavatta's invention. 88
In declaring that Ciavatta's invention was not " 'conceived'... as
a result of his employment with Ingersoll-Rand,"'' 89 the supreme
court was apparently expressing its opinion that courts should
narrowly interpret such phrases in holdover clauses. However, in
not explaining the reasoning behind its conclusion, the supreme
court left open the question of what it means to be "conceived as
a result of." The difficulty arises because the trial court's interpretation seems the most logical. 90 The absence of any rationale
supporting this aspect of the court's determination will undoubtedly lead to confusion in subsequent cases involving similar
provisions.
Overall, the Ingersoll-Rand decision is a repudiation of the
idea that employment contracts should be enforced to the letter
where it would work an injustice on the employee.' 9 1 Implicit in
the court's holding is the recognition that employment contracts
containing holdover provisions and noncompetition agreements
are often contracts of adhesion. The technical employee, as a
consequence of inferior bargaining position, contracts away the
right to use the knowledge and skill he or she acquires for the
promise of terminable-at-will employment. 192 By requiring the
employer to have a "legitimate" interest in the information used
by the former employee in his or her invention before enforcing
a holdover agreement, the court alleviates to some degree the
disparity in the bargaining power between employer and employee.
Kenneth F. D 'Amato
188 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 210 N.J. Super. at 345, 509 A.2d at 824-25.
Specifically, the trial court found that "Ciavatta conceived his invention as a result
of work done during his employment and that it is attributable to that work." Id.
The trial court emphasized the facts that Ciavatta had no prior experience in the
mining industry before his employment with Ingersoll-Rand and that because of his
assignments in this field during his employment, Ciavatta conducted substantial library research which sparked his creative juices. Id. at 345-46, 509 A.2d at 825.
189 Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 640, 542 A.2d at 895.
190 Perhaps the court believed that Ciavatta "conceived" of his friction stabilizer
solely as a result of "his having transferred a light fixture in his home." See supra
note 25.
191 O'Hern, supra note 9.
192 See Ingersoll-Rand, 110 N.J. at 639, 542 A.2d at 894.

